C.S. Lewis on objective morality

[This article is in english since it is part of my course in Apologetics on Danish Pentcostal Bible College]

C.S. Lewis has in his book -The case for Christianity, argued for God’s existence from the basis of an objective morality. His argument is reprinted in the classis book: “Mere Christianity.” He developes the core part of his argument in three steps. First he lays the foundation, then deals with typical objections, and finally he show how the Moral Law is not a descriptive law, but prescriptive.

The Foundation.

When we argue and quarrel over moral issues we display a law bound behaviour of a sort.

“It looks, in fact, very much as if both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behavior or morality or whatever you like to call it, about which they really agreed. And they have. If they had not, they might of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the human sense of the word. Quarreling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.” ¹

In this quarreling we show that we think of moral issues as areas in which we can be right or we can be wrong. It does not make sense if this is not assumed. This is the foundation Lewis works from – the data-set as you may say. A data set that need’s clarification which can be achieved when we look at some objections to this description of Lewis. Lewis deals with two objection.

The Herd Objection

“Isn’t what you call the Moral Law simply our herd instinct and hasn’t it been developed just like all our other instincts?” ²

Lewis has three answers to this objection. All of them uses the picture of a piano, the keys and the sheet of notes. The sheet of notes tells – how to play in the right way. The key’s are a picture of the instincts that produces the sound. His tree answers are:

1. “Feeling a desire to help is quite different is quite different from feeling that you ought to help whether you want to or not.” ³Lewis is here arguing that the Moral Law is judging between the instincts and cannot therefore be one of the instincts. The instinct “I must help” is different from the thing that tells you that whether or not you want to help, you have to do it.In the piano example
   Lewis compares the Moral Law to the sheet of music which tells the pianist which note to play on the keyboard, and the instincts are merely the keys.
2. “If two instincts are in conflict, and there is nothing in a creature’s mind excepts those two instincts, obviously the stronger of the two must win, but at those moments when we are most conscious of the Moral Law, it usually seems to be telling us to side with the weaker of the two impulses.” ⁴The Moral Law shows itself to be another thing than the instincts when it tells us to side with the weakest of the instincts.In the piano example Lewis says that the thing that tells you which note on the piano needs to be played louder cannot itself be that note.
3. “If the Moral Law was one of our instincts, we ought to be able to point to some one impulse inside us which was always what we call “good,” always in agreement with the rule of right behavior. But you cannot.” (pp. 23)
   Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a good or bad impulse. These are morally neutral in and of themselves according to Lewis. And with the view to the Piano example he says:“Think once again of a piano. It has not got two kinds of notes on it, the “right” notes and the “wrong” ones. Every single note is right at one time and wrong at another. The Moral Law is not any one instinct or any set of instincts: it is something which makes a kind of tune (the tune we call goodness or right conduct) by directing the instincts.” (pp. 24)

The Convention Objection
Isn’t what you call the Moral Law just a social convention, something that is put into us by education?

“The people who ask that question are usually taking it for granted that if we have learned a thing from parents and teachers, then that thing must be merely a human invention.” ⁵

The essense of Lewis’ reply is to compare The Moral Law with mathematics.
“We all learned the multiplication table at school. A child who grew up alone on a desert island would not know it. But surely it does not follow that the multiplication table is simply a human convention, something human beings have made up for themselves and might have made different if they had liked?” ⁶

And he sees two reasons for why the Moral Law should be treated as belonging in the Mathematic Class, and not the Convention Class.

1. Though there are differences, they are not really very great – not nearly so great as most people imagine. In the abolition of man Lewis gives a list of the unity of morality accross the world. See it here: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/lewis/abolition4.htm
2. Reason for the mathematic class: Have any of these differences been improvements? If then it is mathematics, if not then it is subjective and convention like.

Prescriptive not descriptive

Finally Lewis ends the core of his analyzis of the Moral Law by showing how the descriptive – ought – cannot account for the prescriptive ought we in our moral practise make use of. We do say that stones ought to fall down due to the law of gravity. And it doesn’t make sense to say that stones or trees ought to be in a way different from what they is. And when we do say this, we have some inconvinience in mind of a special case. We want to use the stone or the tree for something special and their non fitting with this expectation of convinience makes us say that they ought not that way. But this is not the case with the ought we use in practical morality.

He gives a brilliant example from taking the corner seat in a train. He says:

“A man occupying the corner seat in the train because he got there first, and a man who slipped into it while my back was turned and removed my bag, are both equally inconvenient. But I blame the second man and do not blame the first. I am not angry – except perhaps for a moment before I come to my sense – with a man who trips me up by accident; I am angry with a man who tries to trip me up even if he does not succeed.” (Pp. 29)

We are prescribed how to act, and the fact that we are free to act otherwise creates a different kind of ought than any of the rest we see in the universe. We can be “out of order” because we choose not to act in accordance with what is right. Here we are different from any other being on the face of the earth.

Propably one of the best popular counterargument to meet Lewis with is the one developed by Richard Dawkins, that could be frased: “Nice Guys Finish First.” It can be seen here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZS9bcGEnN90

I do not find it able to conclude that there is no Moral Law, but still find it able to bolster an atheist with arguments that can answer some of Lewis replies to the objections. I will not say more on this here, but leave it to a answer/reply section in the comments – so go ahead. Read, watch and leave a comment.

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1. Lewis, Mere Christianity pp. 18 |tilbage|
2. Pp. 22 |tilbage|
3. Pp. 22 |tilbage|
4. Pp. 23 |tilbage|
5. Pp. 24 |tilbage|
6. 24 |tilbage|